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Abstract—Autonomous systems are often needed to perform
tasks in complex and dynamic environments. For this class of
systems the traditional safety assuring methods are not satisfying
because these systems cannot be analyzed completely during
development phase. In order to realize a more flexible safety
analysis the internal representation of the outside world that is
learned by an autonomous Cognitive Technical System is used to
identify hazardous situations. The so called safety principles are
the hazard knowledge. These can be added to the system prior
to operating time without losing the possibility of adjusting or
expanding this hazard knowledge during operating time. How
these safety principles are generally designed and implemented
is explained in this contribution. Furthermore, as underlying
Cognitive Technical System provides anticipation capabilities it is
possible to expand the planning process in order to take hazard
information into account. Finally, in a simulation example is
shown how the autonomous system determines possible future
actions and evaluates them with regard to hazards in order to
provide a plan with acceptable risk.
Index Terms—autonomous system, safe, cognitive technical
system, risk assessment, planning
I. INTRODUCTION
The demand for autonomous systems is rising because of
an increasing need for autonomous technical systems that are
able to execute challenging and complex tasks in unstructured
dynamic environments. In many cases, they have to collab-
orate with humans in a natural and intuitive way and adapt
themselves to varying conditions [21]. Typical examples are
autonomous service robots. In order to realize a high level
of autonomy, the imitation of human cognition including the
representation of knowledge, learning, anticipation, planning
etc. can be helpful. If an autonomous system comprises a
representational level and has capabilities, like learning and
planning, it can be considered as cognitive (see [19]). However,
these cognitive capabilities and the highly flexible interaction
with human users and the environment also increase the risk
that any action of the autonomous system could lead to
injury of humans or damages to the environment. Therefore,
autonomous systems are safety-critical systems that require a
safety strategy in order to assure that no unacceptable risks
exist [6],[2]. However, it seems to be impossible to foresee
all complex interactions between autonomous technical system
and the environment and therefore the derivation of a safety
strategy and the realization of a satisfying risk assessment
during the development phase also seems to be impossible
[21]. Hence, if safety analysis cannot be established during
the development phase sufficiently, it has to be ensured that
the safety aspects are observed during operating time [21].
In order to keep the system’s autonomy these supervision
mechanisms have to be realized by the system itself. There are
only few contributions (see for instance [13],[12],[3]) dealing
with safety aspects of autonomous systems. All of them present
either partial solutions or they are outlining the basic problem
without mentioning a satisfying solution.
In this contribution, a novel approach including a cognitive
architecture for the realization of safe autonomous systems is
presented. The core idea is that the autonomous systems should
have an internal representation of the outside world. This
generated internal representation—a formalized description of
the environment and systemic interaction—enables application
of numerous methods. It is shown how the internal represen-
tation can be used to evaluate the system’s environment with
respect to safety aspects. This again is used for safe action
planning. In this work, the mental model of the cognitive
architecture representing the structure of the real world is
extended by a safety/risk model containing general principles
for the evaluation of situations. Hence, it is possible to consider
safety aspects during planning and interaction. Furthermore,
the approach also allows the learning of the mental model.
The following sections describe the used cognitive architec-
ture as the underlying method, its formalization of interaction
and its representational level. Then, the general method for
recognizing hazards in the system’s environment are outlined.
Finally, the implementation of the proposed approach is de-
scribed and illustrated using a simulation example.
II. REALIZATION OF COGNITIVE TECHNICAL SYSTEMS
In this section, an approach for the realization of Cog-
nitive Technical Systems interacting autonomously with its
environment is presented. The representation of knowledge
which is the key feature of cognitive systems is based on
Situation-Operator-Modeling and implemented by high-level
Petri Nets. As framework for the representational level and the
cognitive functions a cognitive architecture is used. Within the
architecture a mental action space depending on the system’s
knowledge and the current situation is generated and used for
planning. The following subsections describe the methodical
background—the Situation-Operator-Modeling approach—and
the cognitive architecture in detail.
A. Modeling and Analysis of Interactions
For the modeling of interaction, the Situation-Operator-
Modeling (SOM) approach (see [18],[19]) can be applied.
Within the SOM approach the processes in the real world
are considered as sequences of scenes and actions, which are
modeled as situations (time-fixed description of the consid-
ered system or problem) and operators (changes within the
considered system) respectively. A situation si consists of
characteristics ci and relations ri. In technical systems, the
characteristics can be physical values measured by the sensors.
The relations represent an inner structure of the situation,
which extends the classical situation calculus (see [11]) by
linking the characteristics to each other through arbitrary func-
tions. The operators oi have the same quality as the relations of
the situation. An operator transfers a situation to another (oi :
sx → sy). Depending on its functionality, the characteristics,
the relations or both can be changed. The condition whether
an operator can be applied is described by the operator’s
assumptions. An operator on a higher hierarchical level can
be build by the combination of several operators termed as
meta operator (oi→n : si → sn). Furthermore, SOM realizes
a graphical representation, in which situations are illustrated
by gray ellipses with black dots denoting characteristics and
white circles denoting relations. Such as the relations (or
passive operators), also the active operators are represented
by white circles. A detailed description about this underlying
approach is given in [18],[19]. Due to structural similarities,
Fig. 1. Graphical representation of SOM
SOM-based models can be represented by high-level Petri Nets
(HPNs), which may be modeled graphically, simulated, and
analyzed by established software tools. The SOM situation
can be represented by a place with one or several tokens
and the SOM operator can be related to the transition with
guard functions and current bindings. In this contribution,
the software Renew (Reference net workshop) for Reference
nets (see [10]), a special HPN formalism, is applied. As a
special feature, Renew allows Java objects and nets as tokens.
However, it does not provide automated state space generation
or own analysis functions, like other common HPN tools.
Hence, these functionalities have to be realized by the model
itself.
B. Representational level for Cognitive Technical System
The described approach for modeling, simulation, and anal-
ysis of Human-Machine-Interaction can also be used to realize
a representational level for knowledge, which is considered
here as the key feature of cognitive systems. The repre-
sentational level is realized within a cognitive architecture,
which simulates human cognition from a phenomenological
engineering-oriented point of view and builds a unique frame-
work (see [14]) for the realization of cognitive functions.
Represented knowledge and the whole information processing
are characterized by an open and variable structure, a symbolic
representation, and the ability to reduce complexity. Hence,
the approach is not restricted to a few problems or application
fields, the learned facts can be traced by humans, and difficult
tasks/problems can be simplified.
The proposed cognitive architecture (see Fig. 1) comes
with the known three levels for skill-based, rule-based, and
knowledge-based input/output behavior (see [17]. The connec-
tions to the sensors and actuators of the technical system to be
controlled (ego system) are realized by sensing and execution
modules. The input from the sensing module (represented
as situation) is further interpreted by a perception module
applying relations stored in a perception model. The actions
of the ego systems as well as the dynamic of the outside
world (other agents etc.) are represented in an action model in
detail. The action model is used as a basis for the calculation
of a mental action space which can also be extended from
interaction directly. Action and perception model are realized
by sequences of so called operator nets consisting of character-
istic lists as assumptions and function nets which describe the
effects of actions and interpretation principles for situations,
respectively. The combination of action model, mental action
space, and perception model builds the mental model of the
architecture. The planning module takes a goal situation and
the current interpreted situation as inputs and uses the mental
action space to generate a plan containing a sequence of
operators from the current situation to the desired situation.
The execution of plans is organized by the execution module.
During the execution of a plan or during random interaction as
well, it is checked whether the mental model corresponds to the
reality. If differences between the mental model and the reality
are detected, the mental model can be modified accordingly by
two modules for the learning of operators and the learning of
the situation. Furthermore the learning modules are used to
interpret the previously learned knowledge for generalization
and complexity reduction. A detailed description regarding
the modeling of interaction, knowledge representation, and
cognitive functions can be found in [9].
Fig. 2. Structure of the proposed cognitive architecture
III. SAFETY ASPECTS OF AUTONOMOUS SYSTEMS
The general safety strategy includes detection of hazards,
evaluation and implementing of countermeasures by detailed
examination of the system and its operating environment
[6]. When this strategy is applied to autonomous systems a
fundamental problem appears: In accordance to [16] autonomy
is needed when it is difficult to foresee all future situations
the system will get into during normal interaction with its
environment. For complex environments there is need to design
and built autonomous systems without first explicitly identify
the full range and scope of the interaction dynamics. Moreover,
in [8] is stated that there is need for achieving emergence
effects by explicitly omitting inflexible a priori plans or
strategies and fixed internal functional structures. From that
follows finally and strictly spoken that there is available for
safety analysis neither a definable environment nor functional
predefined system. The few contributions that are addressed to
the topic ’safety of autonomous systems’ have in common that
they are no overcoming this problem.
In [13] it is introduced a method, how to link outcomes
of safety surveillance components to an extended fault tree
analysis, in order improve fault detection. The system is
assumed as safe when there are no faults. In other words the
system is safe when it is conform to its specifications. This
approach therefore requires for a complete specification of the
system’s component dependencies beforehand.
In [12] and [15] is described a method how a probabilis-
tic model can be defined to enable decision-making under
considering of safety aspects. The hazard analysis—realized
by a fault tree analysis—is the basis of the quantitative
and probabilistic description of accident or hazardous events.
Indeed, it is proposed to map relations between accident events
and causal factors but it is suggested a ’hand-crafted’ fault tree
analysis observing static event combinations and static accident
severity information.
In [3] is outlined how a certification process of autonomous
systems could be put into practice. One central aspect of this
approach is to consider possible hazards of future scenarios.
The effort to generate (a complete) hazard analysis therefore
depends very strongly on the complexity of the operating
environment. The question arises, why is there need for au-
tonomous capabilities if the system environment is analyzed
completely?
The mentioned approaches are important to increase safety
aspects of autonomous systems, albeit they cannot raise a
claim to make autonomous systems safe. Decision risks or
action risks that are very closely related to interaction dynamic
(see [20]) are from central interest for autonomous system.
These are focused in this contribution. In accordance to [21]
it is proposed to supplement the traditional safety methods by
adding so called dynamic risk assessment. With the help of
generalized cause-consequence dependencies the risk assess-
ment dynamically generates limits. In the following it is shown
how dynamic online risk analysis can be realized methodically
and can be put into practice. If, namely, a method is made
available that is able to automatically identify hazards, it could
be allowed to safely modify the internal representation of the
outside world or the internal structure of the system (e.g. by
learning methods) during operation.
The core idea is that first of all future situations are
predicted based on a representation of the real world and then
the deviated mental action model is automatically assessed
with the help of ’general safety principles’. Hence, the in-
formation about dangerous states or situations can be used to
identify actions or whole action sequences which results in
these dangerous situations. This again can be used within the
planning process.
In this approach the safety assessment is applied mental
action space which represents the anticipation capabilities of
the underlying Cognitive Technical System (see Fig. 2). The
mental action space is evaluated, supplemented with safety
information and then provided to the planning algorithm again.
Herein, a first step comprises a check of the provided situations
and a search for applicable safety principle in a database. If an
suitable safety principle is found then an associated risk value
can be computed with the help of the connected instruction for
risk determination. The processing of these instructions gener-
ates risk information that added to the respective situation. The
risk information describe the risk of any particular situation.
This additional information allows the planning of actions
that also take safety aspects into account. In this contribution
a probabilistic based planning method is proposed for this
purpose.
The risk information is encoded with risk values. These
combine both, accident severity and probability (Risk =
SAcc · PAcc). Therefore, accidental events (PAcc = 1) or
hazards (0 ≥ PAcc > 1) can be described. The severity is
assumed to be 0 ≥ SAcc ≥ 1 whereby SAcc = 1 denotes
worst case accident. In this contribution the risk values are
figured out as percentage values. For instance, a risk value of
risk = 100% is the incidence of the worst case accident.
For the realization of on-line risk analysis some require-
ments are to mention. Besides the representational level for
knowledge,the system should comprise
1) a risk function based on a general (dynamic) risk model
in a knowledge base (safety principles),
2) a measure of the distance from actual state to any
hazardous states,
3) a planning algorithm considering risk information and
4) a method and measure to describe the quality of the
overall risk evaluation.
These topics are explained in detail in the following sec-
tions.
A. Risk Function and General Risk Models
In this approach the safety assessment is applied on the
anticipation capabilities of the underlying Cognitive Technical
System—on the mental action space (see Fig. 2). The overall
process is to generate the mental action space (anticipations),
evaluate it, supplement it with risk information and then
provide it to the planning algorithm again (see Fig. 3). The
Fig. 3. Safety assessment of a mental representation
kinds of hazards that occur during operation time differ with
respect to the acting system level. Every hierarchical level
needs for level specific risk factors [20]. This contribution
focuses the knowledge-based level. On this knowledge-based
level there are more abstract hazards and hazards based on
decisions. Often, these hazards are side effects of actions. For
example, they are caused by the infringing of conventions, by
the manipulation of dangerous objects or by the interacting of
objects in the environment. For instance, an automatic park
system could park on the fire line or a domestic robot could
place any object on a hot cooking plate.
A set of fundamental safety principles should constrain
the system’s degrees of freedom strongly by universal
quantifiers—a conservative set of safety principles. This con-
servative core contains principles that are principally valid, e.g.
never kill a human. The principles are constrains that can be
refined during operation. The refinement of the dynamic safety
knowledge is from central interest especially with regard to
environment’s multiplicity. The basic requirements of dynamic
safety principles are considered in principle, but they are not
detailed in this contribution.
Basically, it is important to formulate these as universal
principles. Due to the problem that future situations are not
known in detail, it seems to be reasonable to implement
principles that are valid in all future situations. For example,
heated plastic materials generate toxic vapors or start to burn.
So, the principle that the combination of intense heat and
plastic materials is dangerous is not true in all cases, but
not wrong in ’conservative’ safety concept. If an exception
is known it could be added to the knowledge, in all other
cases the system would avoid to approximate ’plastic’ to ’heat
sources’ generally. The safety principle could also be cause-
and-effect chains that are derived, for instance, from natural
laws (interaction of objects) or from social conventions. The
main difference to an conventional safety strategy is that the
limitations are realized in a dynamic knowledge representation.
This knowledge can be extended or adapted in principle.
Basically, the principles are valid premises which can be
used with (valid) observations for deductive conclusion. If the
rules exists ’plastic object close to a heat source is hazardous’
and there would be the observation ’plastic object is close to
heat source’ then the conclusion ’hazard occurs’ would be
correct. Key problems will be the complexity and the complete-
ness of this so called ’safety knowledge’. The completeness is
linked to ’assessment quality discussion’ below (see III-C).
The complexity problem is linked to the ’safety principle
learning topic’ and will be discussed in future research work.
Basically, the problem can be circumvented by applying a
two step approach: 1) basic and important safety principles
must be included beforehand 2) refinement of the principles is
allowed under specific circumstances (training phase, learning
by supervision etc.). In this contribution is shown how this
can be realized with rule based knowledge systems. Basically,
rule based systems are not sufficient for integrating of new
knowledge. Therefore, knowledge management methods, for
example ’Truth-Maintenance-Systems’, have to be applied in
future to ensure the consistence of knowledge.
A further problem that also appears in the mentioned
example above is to describe the term ’hazard’ numerically.
If the condition is fulfilled, that plastic material is too close to
the heat source, how dangerous is it in numbers? Most often the
risk seems to depend on additional parameters, for instance, on
temperature and distance. If the condition of a safety principle
is fulfilled, then the determination of the respective risk value
takes place by computation of the related risk function. The
risk function basically is generated with known risk values.
Most often extreme values or uncritical values are known.
These can be used as basic information to approximate a
risk function (see also [20]). During operating time future
experiences could be considered by updating the respective
risk function.
B. Measure of distance to hazardous states
In the proposed approach is described how hazardous
situations can be detected with the help of safety principles.
The Cognitive Technical System in this approach enables
to generate possible future situations, thus, future hazardous
situations are predictable as well. To remain in a safe situation,
situations with unacceptable risks must be avoided [2] and
therefore transitions into situations with unacceptable risk are
prohibited. Furthermore, the risk could be reduced additionally,
if a maximum ’distance’ to hazardous situations is kept. From
that follows, that a ’distance’ to a hazardous situation or better
be called ’safety margin’ is from central interest, regardless of
whether they are represented by time, steps or actions. With
regard to decisions on a deliberative level the consideration
of the safety margin enables to be fault tolerant with respect
to decisions. For instance, if the safety evaluation with safety
margin of n actions detects no unacceptable risks then it is
ensured that despite the executing of n arbitrary actions (of
situational allowed actions) the system remains in safe state. In
case of systems with learning capabilities, safety in exploration
activity can be enabled.
The Markov-Transition-Matrix is used to test for the reach-
ability of future states or situations. The action space which is
provided by the Technical Cognitive System (see II) contains
the actual situation and future possible situations. Future situ-
ations are reachable by applying allowed actions (transitions).
Each situation has a set of allowed actions. There are no
preferred actions to enable a experience independent evalu-
ation. Therefore, the actions space can be seen as a stochastic,
homogeneous Markov-Chain of first order and the Markov-
Transition-Matrix can be applied to compute the probability
of transitions.
To transform the action space into the transition matrix the
operators (transition between two situations) are transferred
into a Markov transition matrix with the dimension of j × j
with j situations in the action space. Each allowed operator
increases the transition probability between its initial and final
situation. The sum of each matrix row is normalized to 1.
Final states such as goal state or ’death’ states (used in the
example later on) are absorbing states (no allowed operators
available). For instance, if there are two allowed operators in
(initial) situation S1 then the transition probability is ’0.5’ in
each case: to reach final situations Sx or Sy. Thus, the state
space in form of transitions from Si to Sj via operator oi,j
can be translated to the transition matrix M :
M =


P (o1,1) . . . P (oi,1)
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
P (o1,j) . . . P (oi,j)


With the help of rising M to the power of n the transition
probability from Si to Sj in n steps can be computed.
Furthermore, each situation S1 . . . Si contains k risk values
(from evaluation of k safety principles), therefore a risk matrix
containing the risk values 1 . . . k could be generated:
R =


R1(S1) . . . R1(Si)
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
Rk(S1) . . . Rk(Si)


The product of transition probability matrix Mn and the
transposed risk matrix generates the risk matrix RPn for taking
n random actions into account:
RPn = M
n ×RT
With regard to planned action the risk matrix can be used
as look-up table to find out the corresponding risk. Depending
on which RPn is computed (with regard to n) different safety
margins can be taken into account. The safety margin can
be seen as a combined measure how far hazardous situations
are away and how likely their incidence is. For instance,
if a safety margin of ’1’ is considered and there are three
allowed actions in situation S2 and one of these leads to a
’mortal’ situation S3 (severity SAcc = 1), then changing from
situation S1 to S2 will result in a future random action risk
(decision error) of risk1 = 33% (see Fig. 4 left). If a safety
margin of ’2’ is considered then the change to situation S1
(assumed there are three allowed actions in starting situation
S1 and in intermediate situation S2) will result to risk1 = 0%
(no dangers are ’in sight’ with regard to safety margin ’1’)
and risk2 = 0.33 · 0.33 ≈ 11% (see Fig.4 right). From
this results that in situations with no risk (risk11/2 = 0%)
one/two random actions could be applied without reaching
a dangerous/’mortal’ situation. In the case of risk2 = 11%
follows that there is a risk of 11% to ’die’ (SAcc = 1) when
two descion errors (random actions) occur.
S0
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Fig. 4. Safety margin for one or two actions
Thus, information describing the distance to dangerous
situations allow 1) to reduce the set of situations which should
be reachable by the system and 2) to plan with consideration
of risk optima. It seems to be reasonable to optimize risks
also under consideration of respective task benefit. Higher risks
seem to be accepted when the advantage to risk something is
counterbalanced.
C. Expanded subject-matter of safety in case of autonomous
systems
There seems to be a lack of definitions for danger causes
in the traditional safety terminology. For example, if an au-
tonomous mobile service robot comes to close to a fireplace
and starts burning or the service robot provokes fire by putting
a plastic object on a cooking plate in accordance to its task
’bring dishes to kitchen’, how could these problems be called?
Should it be called a failure, an error, fault, disturbance, defect
or malfunction (definitions in accordance to [2] [1])? In case of
the fire-catching robot it is 1) a defect or disturbance when the
temperature sensor is out of order and the system therefore is
not able to detect the increase of surrounding temperature or 2)
a malfunction when there are requirements in the specifications
but no implementation on this issue. A fire-catching robot
without temperature sensor has a failure when it is damaged by
the fire—the robot loses its capabilities despite being in full
accordance to the specifications. Indeed, these specifications
are incomplete in the described case because the knowledge of
accurate environment description is missing. In the traditional
sense, this problem could be treated as incomplete specification
or specification mistake.
To prevent hazardous actions as mentioned above, ’safety
principles’ are enabling the system to recognize hazards and
thus they enable to keep away from them. If these ’safety
principles’ are assumed to be a kind of knowledge (due to their
degree of abstraction), then hazards can only occur (assuming
a perfect reliable and fault-free system) due to lack of ’safety
knowledge’. From this follows, safety can be improved only
by ’completing’ the knowledge with regard to dangers causes.
If it is assumed that the completeness of the safety knowledge
is impossible, then any providing of safety evidence can only
take place empirically. However, on that point, it is from central
interest to consider the quality of the safety assessment. For
example, an indicator for ’level of familiarity’ could be useful
to recognize entering in a new environment or executing a
complete unknown task. An indicator for ’routine’ allows for
increasing or decreasing of the autonomous system’s execution
speed. These topics are not part of this contribution but will
be addressed in future contributions.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION
A. Safety assessment of situations and actions
Taking the proposed approach for modeling complex in-
teractions between an autonomous system and its environment
into account, the question arises whether situations or operators
should be examined for safety assessment. Intuitively, people
tend to focus on dangerous actions (operators), because actions
are are changing things. This contribution however, safety
aspects are always related to the actual situation in the SOM
approach and dangerous actions are those actions that lead
to hazardous situations. Therefore, it is assumed that the
definition of hazardous situations is sufficient.
B. Connection of safety principles and action space
The action space is a set of possible future situations that
will result from applying respective operators. Each situation
is a representation of the actual perceived situations of the
real world which contains all relevant information in form
of characteristics. The characteristics are derived from the
system’s inputs applying an interpretation process. The goal
of any risk assessment is to add one additional characteristic
as one further characteristics [20] to any situation. These
risk characteristics are generated by interpreting the current
situation with the help of safety principles. Of course this
method is suffering from the same restrictions as the overall
system: phenomena that are not included in any sensory or
input information cannot be considered at all. In order to
be able to evaluate safety aspects at an upper deliberative
level, also more abstract information must be processed. To
give an example, a service robot should fulfill the task ’put
the plastic bowl beside the kitchen sink’. The fulfillment of
this task requires the capability to identify objects. On basis
of these high level abstraction mechanisms, also high level
safety principles must be generated. The reliability of the
underlying process has to be considered as well. Additionally,
the availability of all relevant information has to be considered.
In order to simplify this complexity, the following conditions
are assumed to be fulfilled (while knowing well that they are
not trivial):
• All underlying processes are free of faults and failures.
• The representation of the relevant system’s environment
is complete.
If the representation is asumed to be complete, the service
robot for instance is able to recognize all required objects like
the plastic bowl. However, the robot might also detect the flat
surface of the stove as an ideal place to deposit the bowl. Plac-
ing the bowl on a hot cooking plate may lead to the emission
of toxic vapors or even fire an hence possible descision exists
that lead to hazardous situations. A general formulation of a
safety principle could be as follows. All detectable objects are
included in a knowledge base, where objects are associated to
attributes. For example, the object O1 ’bowl’ is contained in the
knowledge base with the corresponding attributes like ’liquid
container’, ’plastic’, ’open on topside’, etc. This approach
follows the ’object and attribute concept’ in [4]. The object
O2 ’stove’ may be related to the attributes ’extreme heat’,
’in kitchen’, etc. Using this approach safety principles can
be formulated as shown in Fig. 5 (according to [5]). If the
Object 1
is plastic
Object 2
is hot
R1
Plastic
is getting hot
R11
R12
Risk
of fire
Risk
of vapor
Fig. 5. Safety principles for interaction of plastic and heat
matching safety principles are found in a current situation, the
corresponding risk value must be calculated. Each principle
defines how the respective risk value has to be computed.
For example, if the risk strongly depends on physical facts
like distance, a suitable risk function would be defined that
takes these parameters (distance of two objects, e.g.) into
account, respectively. In many cases it would be helpful to
use a quantitative approach like fuzzy methods instead of a
qualitative functions, see also [20].
C. Planning under consideration of safety aspects
After assessing the risk of possible future situations, a the
planning algorithm now can also take the possible risks of
any planned action into account. Therefore, the determined
risk values are added as transition (operator) costs. Hence, a
weighted graph results. A transition from an arbitrary situation
to a situation containing a risk value of 5% will cost 5, e.g. In
order to determine whether the goal situation is reachable and
what are the respective costs, several methods can be applied.
In this contribution a Dijkstra algorithm is applied to calculate
the path from an initial to a desired situation regarding the
minimum costs. If large graphs have to be analyzed, also
heuristic methods could be applied to reduce the processing
time [5].
Finally, a system would be called safe if all occurring risks
are lower than the tolerable risk threshold. So the planning
algorithm should minimize the cost (i.e. overall risk) on the
one side but also has to consider the risk-benefit relation with
respect to maximum allowable risk.
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
A. Experimental scenario
As an example application, an arcade game [7] is cho-
sen, where an autonomous agent interacts in a grid-based
environment. This example is perfect in order to illustrate
the derived methodologies and can be arbitrarily extended to
achieve higher degrees of complexity. The environment consist
of different kinds of fields and the agent can perform the
actions ’up’, ’down’, ’left’, and ’right’. In general, the task
consists of first picking up a certain number of ’emeralds’,
by entering related fields, and then finishing the level by
leaving the scenario through an exit door (see Fig. 6). Here,
the agent is performing actions with help of the proposed
cognitive architecture. Any situation Si, as the input of the
architecture, consists of the characteristics ’x-position’ (inte-
ger), ’y-position’ (integer), ’type of the current field’ (string),
and ’collected points’ (integer). This example is now used to
illustrate the action planning including safety aspects based
on mental action space. The agent has to leave the level by
reaching the exit door in the lower right corner, which can
be reached by using a lot of different paths. Furthermore, an
emerald can be picked up to increase the amount of collected
points. This is no necessary condition to finish the scenario,
however it can be used as an additional factor influencing the
planning process. The considered scenario also contains three
acid fields and a hostile monster agent performing horizontal
Fig. 6. Example scenario of the arcade game
movements. A collision with either the monster or the acid
fields would lead to the undesired ’death’ of the agent. In
the considered application example a safety principle P1 is
defined.
P1 : Pos (player) = Pos (mortal field) → risk = 1
A : mortal field = {acid field,monster}
The conditional parts become true, if the position of the player
is equal to the position of a ’mortal field’ (which again could
contain ’attributes A’ ’acid field’ or ’monster’). The related
risk is defined as 1 (accident severity SAcc = 1 means ’death’
of agent, accident probability PAcc = 1 when the condition of
safety principle is fulfilled and risk = SAcc · PAcc).
B. Experimental results
The mental action space is generated based on the initial
situation of the agent (lower left corner) and contains all
possible future situations and actions. In Fig. 1, a part of the
mental action space as it results in in this example is depicted
using the SOM symbolic and colors in accordance to their
present risk. Here, the hostile monster and the emerald in the
upper right corner are not considered for a simplification. After
the generation of the mental action space, it is evaluated with
two different safety margins. These can be identified by the
index: risk1, risk2. The risk value means in accordance to
the above mentioned principle that agent’s ’death’ is described
with severity of ’1’. Therefore, the risk in respective situations
is assumed as 100% (’mortal’) because the event ’agent
death’ is certain and multiplied with severity ’1’.In case of
risk1 = 33% every third random future action (starting from
respective situation) will lead to agent’s ’death’. In case of
risk2 = 33% the performing of two random actions will lead
in every third case to agent’s ’death’. From this results that
in situations with no risk (risk1/2 = 0%) one/two random
actions could be applied without reaching a dangerous/’mortal’
situation.
The complete actions space and evaluation of the simplified
example is illustrated in Fig. 7. The shortest route will lead
over situation S3,4,5,8 to the goal situation S21. This path
is dangerous because it is close to the acid fields (S9,10,11:
colored red). Any decision error or exploration step will lead
with high probability to the agent’s ’death’.
For planning the Dijkstra algorithm is used. It generates
paths under consideration of its costs. Thus, each transition
from Si → Sj costs: costij = 1 + risk (Sj), whereby
the risk value is assumed to be expressed in percent
(0 . . . 100). The overall costs of the path ~S with the elements
S0 . . . Sn or n actions (with n ∈ N∗) are calculated
cost0,n = n+
∑n
x=1 risk (S
x). This example cost formula is
a very safety oriented variant. The plan with lowest costs is:
costs(~S : S2,6,7,12,13,18,16,8,21). The goal is reachable without
any risks when considering a safety margin of one action.
The plan does not change by considering safety margin of
two actions but the maximum risk rises to risk2 = 11.1% and
the costs amount 37 (≈ 11.1(%)+8.3(%)+8.3(%)+9(steps)).
Path 1: maxrisk2(8) = 11, 1%, n = 9 steps, costs = 37,
emeralds = 0:
oa:up,oa:right(8%),oa:right(8%),oa:up,oa:right,
oa:right,oa:down,oa:down(11%),oa:right
By examination of the level picture (Fig. 6), it can be seen
that there is a bottleneck caused by the ledge directly above
the player’s starting position. It is not possible to pass the acid
containers with a greater safety margin.
When the dynamic elements (monster, emerald) are
taken into account, too, the complexity of the evaluation is
increasing. The action space contains 816 situations (instead
of 23), 1662 operators, 22 different goal constellations and
therefore it is too big to be illustrated. If the scenario is
evaluated again with safety margin ’1’ then the goal can be
reached without any risks. For shortest route there are used 18
steps and 30 steps for the case that the emerald is collected.
The planning process under consideration of safety margin
’2’ and collecting the emerald, results in:
Path 11: maxrisk2(383) = 37, 5%, n = 42 steps,
costs = 111, emeralds = 1:
om:right,om:right,om:right,om:right,om:right,om:left,
oa:up,om:left,oa:right,om:left,oa:right,om:left,
oa:up,om:left,oa:right,om:right,oa:right,om:right,
oa:down,om:right,om:right,om:right,om:left,oa:up,
om:left,oa:up,om:left,oa:right,om:left,oa:right,
om:left,oa:left,om:right,oa:left,om:right(38%),oa:down,
om:right(31%),oa:down,om:right,oa:down,om:right,oa:right
When the emerald should be collected, then costs of 42
actions and maximum risk of 37.5% or overall costs of 111
have to be accepted. It can be seen by evaluating the plan,
how the movement of the monster is considered for avoiding of
collisions. When the emerald should be collected, then costs of
42 actions and maximum risk of 37.5% or overall costs of 111
have to be accepted. When the actions sequence is regarded it
can be seen how the movement of the monster is taken into
account to avoid collisions. The autonomous system waits until
the monster is in the left corner. This moment is used to pass
the rock in the center of the scenario. If the monster again is
in the left corner, the moment is used to collect the emerald.
VI. SUMMARY AND OUTLOOK
A new safety assurance approach is needed because it is dif-
ficult to realize a safety analysis for autonomous systems with
traditional methods. With so called safety principles a solution
is presented how hazards can be recognized dynamically. The
generating of plans with respect to hazard information can be
realized with the help of the underlying Technical Cognitive
System’s learning and anticipation capabilities.
The presented approach enables to combine general safety
knowledge during the design phase with mechanisms for
knowledge refinement and completion during the operating
time. Hence, maximum efforts assuring safety take place
during the development phase. The application, refinement,
and completion of the safety knowledge can be performed by
the autonomous system itself during operating time. This is
described in principle and additionally it is demonstrated in a
simulation example.
First of all, the Cognitive Technical Systems generates the
’action space’ consisting of future reachable situations. These
situations are evaluated with regard to hazards and supple-
mented with this risk information. After that further risk values
are added to situations that are related to dangerous situations
in order to additionally take nearby dangerous situations into
account. Furthermore, all risk information is used, amongst
other things, to calculate the costs of possible plans.
This is demonstrated in a small simulation example. The
results of the simulation example are plans for fulfilling given
task and respective costs with regard to risks and benefits.
It can be seen clearly how the autonomous system generates
plans with maximum ’distance’ to hazardous situations. Ad-
ditionally, the behavior of dynamic (moving) elements in the
environment is taken into account. Finally, this contribution
shows that it fundamentally is possible to enable autonomous
Technical Cognitive Systems to perform a risk assessment on-
line and, furthermore, to generate plans taking this hazard
information into account. Therefore, the result is an optimal
action sequence with regard to perceived hazards what can
be reproduced and checked with the simulation example.
The remaining risks, if available, can either be limited to
an acceptable risk or counterbalanced with task fulfillment
benefits.
Initially, the applied safety principles are kept very simple,
in order to show primarily the functionality of the presented
method. Surely, there will be various problems when extending
this method to real world problems. This and the learning
of new and consistent safety knowledge are not part of this
contribution but will be addressed in future research work.
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